Opinion

Book Review | Armour '71: A history of tank-based operations in 1971 Indo-Pak war

It is a definitive book of lasting importance backed by painstaking and meticulous research

Maj Gen Jagatbir Singh Last Updated:October 29, 2023 16:07:27 IST

T-55, Indian Army Tank. Wikimedia Commons

The Indian Armoured Corps has fought and ensured victory in all major conflicts in the post-Independence era. It has operated effectively in diverse terrain and climatic conditions, ranging from the high mountains in Zojila (1948) and Chushul (1962), in developed terrain including Patton Nagar at Khemkaran (1965), Akhnoor, and Shakargarh (1965 and 1971), in the deserts to include Longewala (1971), in the riverine terrain of Bangladesh (1971), in the jungles and built-up areas in Sri Lanka during the IPKF Operations (1987), and recently at the high altitude in eastern Ladakh (2021). Armour assures both deterrence and destruction.

The book Armour ’71, commissioned by the Cavalry Officers Association, documents the various battles in the 1971 Indo-Pak War, both for their remarkable operational execution as well as lessons for current military professionals that are relevant even today. This outstanding initiative under Lieutenant General Amit Sharma (Retd) and a team of three highly committed authors has meticulously researched and recorded the history of armour operations in 1971 with a great deal of granularity.

About the Book

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Beginning with the politico-diplomatic perspective of the conflict, the build up to the war, and armour operations in each theatre followed by naval and air operations, the canvas of Armour ’71 is undoubtedly wide. The book covers interesting viewpoints and the role of armour in offensive and defensive operations. It also includes the employment of tanks in East Pakistan which posed many problems due to the riverine terrain with the large numbers of rivers and streams that required to be crossed.

1971 is widely remembered as a liberation war, a war that led to the creation of a new nation. Of all four wars with Pakistan, the 1971 war is remembered as the decisive one. All wars and battles lead to outcomes, invariably interpreted as victory or defeat by the protagonists and the India-Pakistan wars are no different, but the 1971 war is still accepted as a decisive victory for India for it achieved an outcome that changed the map of the region forever.

The objectives of the military campaign were clear. In the East, it had to be the decisive defeat of Pakistan; in the West, it was to ensure that Pakistan was unable to make any gains in Jammu and Kashmir while exploring possibilities of capturing territory in Rajasthan and Sindh that could be politically useful at the negotiating table. The force levels were deployed accordingly.

General Candeth, in his book on the 1971 war, stated, “The Chief of Army Staff informed us, his Army Commanders that the aim of the government was to create conditions by helping the Mukti Bahini drive out the Pakistanis and install a popular government in Dacca so that the ten million or so refugees could go back home and live peacefully. He told us that it was no part of India’s policy to humiliate Pakistan. India sought to achieve a quick victory in the East and carry out only holding operations in the West.”

While the Indian Army had undergone major modernisation and expansion post the 1962 conflict, the focus was on the northern borders and lesser emphasis was laid on armour. In fact, in 1965 Pakistan had more armoured regiments than India. But after 1965, the gaze fell on the Armoured Corps and ten additional Regiments were raised and our holdings were modernised with the induction of T-54, T-55 and PT -76 tanks from the USSR and our own Vijyantas. The Centurions still proved to be battle winning and we still held the Light AMX-13 and some Shermans.

In the east there were three Armoured Regiments. 45 Cavalry and 69 Armoured Regiment were equipped with Pt-76 and 63 Cavalry had been converted to T -55 , in addition, there were two independent Armoured Squadrons equipped with the PT -76’s discarded by 63 Cavalry.

45 Cavalry was the first Regiment to be blooded in battle in this war on 21 November 1971. Over the next twenty six days, the regiment fought twenty-nine actions with seventeen battalions of the 4 Mountain Division and 9 Infantry Division, the last two being on 16 December, the day of the surrender. The actions by Major DS Narag at Garibpur where they destroyed five Pakistani Chafee tanks and Second Lieutenant Sam Chandavarkar are beautifully illustrated. Major Narag who was killed in battle was awarded the Maha Vir Chakra.

5 (Independent) Armoured Squadron of 63 Cavalry commanded by Major SS Mehta was involved in three major operations which were Akhaura, Ashuganj and the crossing of the mighty River Meghna in the most innovative manner. This Squadron was the only Armoured element to be in Dacca for the ‘Surrender Ceremony’.

On 17 December, Lieutenant Colonel Pawittar Singh Takhar, Commandant of 69 Armoured Regiment, had the unique opportunity to accept the surrender of Lieutenant Colonel Bukhari, Commanding Officer Pakistan 29 Cavalry.

It was decided to use a mix of T-55 tanks and PT-76s in each regiment evolving the concept of light armour supported by medium armour a T-55 Squadron along the axis which was generally firm terrain and PT-76 tanks would be employed to carry out outflanking moves across wet paddy fields. Armour Operations in East Pakistan were successful due to correct employment and aggressive action with high initiative at the sub-unit level. Nevertheless, it must be remembered that tank actions can only succeed if they have detailed infantry, artillery and air support, with very carefully executed logistics support.

India’s strategy in the West was aimed at preventing loss of territory. Several small offensives were planned to capture vulnerable salient’s along the cease fire line and also along the international border. The original plan was to launch offensives in Chhamb and in the Shakargarh Bulge. A major advance was to take place in the desert towards Naya Chor. A smaller push in the direction of Rahimyar Khan was also possibly considered.

The authors have interviewed veterans who participated in the war, got access to regimental records and read various accounts of battles including some by Pakistani writers before compiling this book. With the advantage of hindsight and their experience, they have documented all the armour actions ranging from subunits to formations and have also given an insight into the remarkable personalities who contributed to India’s stellar victories.

A contingency plan to employ the armoured division across the border was also made in the event of Pakistan committing its reserves in the Shakargarh area. Neither this nor the plan for the offensive in Chhamb were executed. In fact, the Armoured Division remained ‘on a tight leash’ throughout.

The battle of Chhamb, where two armoured regiments, Deccan Horse and 72 Armoured Regiment, fought an integrated battle as part of 10 Infantry Division and displayed gallantry, resolute grit, and determination, which led to the destruction of enemy armour and stymied their offensive on the west bank of the Munawar Tawi, has been covered with a great deal of granularity. Yet ‘it is quite inexplicable that the Deccan Horse which blunted the Pakistan armour in the initial stages was denied the Battle Honour of Chhamb’.

The battles of Shakargarh , Dera Baba Nanak, Shejra ,Fazilka and Longewala have been covered in great detail with maps and rare photographs that have added value to the book.

In the western sector, Second Lieutenant Arun Kheterpal of Poona Horse was awarded the Param Vir Chakra whereas Brigadier Arun Vaidya, Commander of 16 ( Independent) Armoured Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel RM Vohra commanding Hodsons Horse, Lieutenant Colonel Sukhjit Singh commanding Scinde Horse and Lieutenant Colonel Hanut Singh commanding Poona Horse were all awarded Mahavir Chakras. The battles of these and many other illustrious regiments which fought in the western sector have been covered in greatest of detail bringing out issues that have not yet lost their relevance.

Conclusion

Though 1971 reflected a combination of strategic decisiveness among the political leadership, unity across the party lines, setting out of clear political objectives and a relationship of trust in the advice rendered by the military leadership. It was no doubt a whole nation approach working on a common script, that enabled India to claim that it was on the right side of history.

However, as General VN Sharma wrote: “Despite India’s great victory, in the Shimla Agreement, it is not clear why PM Indira Gandhi let Pakistan ‘off the hook’ on the question of the conflict in the state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) and the need for settlement of the border and termination of terrorist activity by Pakistan.”

A definitive book of lasting importance backed by painstaking and meticulous research, it will undoubtedly assist future military leaders in training for the next conflict in varied and difficult terrain and understanding the express need for effective cooperation between all the military services and departments of government, for success in battle.

The author is a retired Major General of the Indian Army. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely that of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.

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